

TOP SECRET

25X1

13 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research
SUBJECT : Warning/Indications Task Force
Report (COMIREX-D-13.7/1)

1. At your request a committee under my chairmanship, consisting of the chiefs of the Strategic Forces, Ground Forces, Aircraft Systems, and Naval Systems branches, reviewed the Warning/Indications Task Force Report (COMIREX-D-13.7/1). We believe the report is a good beginning. We would concur in most of its recommendations but feel that it should:

a. Include additional discussion of the capability of [redacted] [redacted] imagery-collection system to assist in satisfying basic or special reconnaissance requirements;

25X1


b. Provide more information on how target samples were selected; and

c. Focus primarily on strategic warning and avoid recommendations in the tactical warning area.

2. None of the systems mentioned in the COMIREX report is capable of giving sufficient warning of a maximum surprise attack. In the

25X1

25X1



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

709A002100010007-2

25X1

25X1

indications of Soviet preparations or readiness for attack, neither it nor any of the other systems will provide evidence of an actual Soviet decision to launch an attack. The amount of warning that we might get from the imagery system depends on our ability to interpret quickly enough the significance of the indications obtained.

25X1

5. Although the COMIREX report gives lead times and targets which are acceptable for a system analysis by NRO, we believe that it exaggerates the problem. Some of the lead times probably are longer and the number of critical targets probably are less than those in the COMIREX report. A recent study of the equipment shortage in the Soviet ground forces of the Belorussian Military District leads us to believe that the lead time available for ground force tank and motorized rifle units is greater than the 10 to 15 days used in the report. As for critical targets, we would exclude, for example, ground force depots in interior cities such as Omsk and Tbilisi. We feel that the target base and lead times should be re-examined and that, at the same time, an assessment should be made of the warning indicators in the period after 1972.

25X1

-2-

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

25X1

6. The above points have been discussed with [redacted] the CIA member of the Indications Task Force, COMIREX.

7. We have reviewed DIA's comments on the COMIREX report and agree with its recommendation that COMIREX should address the problem of strategic warning and avoid recommendations in the tactical warning area. We also agree that the report could be strengthened by additional information on the criteria used to select the target samples. We concur with DIA that additional information is required to determine the need for supporting interpretation and analytical capabilities and procedures but we believe that this determination can be made after NRO completes the system analysis and the system proposal has been submitted. We agree that an assessment of future warning indicators should be made, but we believe that this can be done while NRO is making the system analysis. We are in accord with DIA that the target identification and base should be re-examined but, while DIA expects the base to increase, we believe that it can be reduced.

8. It is recommended that OSR undertake a study, at the time judged appropriate by the CIA COMIREX member, to determine the target base and listings which will be significant after 1972.

25X1

[redacted]
Chief, Theater Forces Division, OSR

TOP SECRET

25X1